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Electronic surveillance post 9/11 
Abstract 
This paper examines the legal and practical issues surrounding electronic surveillance systems 
implemented since the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks in three countries: the United States of 
America, Singapore and Australia. The paper determines their effectiveness on border security, 
particularly at airports. Notably, the response of each country has been influenced by its cultural 
structure. Central to advanced security technologies is the field of biometrics. 
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surveillance systems implemented since the September 11th 2001 terrorist 
attacks in three countries: the United States of America, Singapore and Australia. 
The paper determines their effectiveness on border security, particularly at 
airports. Notably, the response of each country has been influenced by its cultural 
structure. Central to advanced security technologies is the field of biometrics.

























The vast changes in surveillance implemented after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks have both legal and technical characteristics. The United States 
of America and several other countries have passed legislation to tighten 
security, giving police and intelligence services greater powers and permitting 
faster political responses to terrorist attacks. These countries have also upgraded 
surveillance exercises in their critical border-control strategies.
Sweeping legislative changes and broad anti-terror laws have effectively 
sanctioned powerful surveillance methods. As a result, technological responses 
to September 11 have proliferated. Current surveillance-related responses to 
September 11 include iris scans at airports (implemented in Europe and North 
America), enhanced closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras in public places 
with facial recognition capabilities and DNA databanks used to store genetic 
information capable of identifying known terrorists. Evidently, surveillance is no 
longer a technology used merely for controlling mobility. Biometrics security 
technologies, including fingerprint, face, and iris systems, are at the forefront. 
However, while such technologies undoubtedly aid security, the negative impact 
of such advances is their invasiveness upon privacy.
Background
In the wake of the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks in the US, contemporary 
society has witnessed a proliferation of surveillance technology. Such 
advancements are essentially aimed at making the world a safer place but have 
invaded many aspects of daily life. For example, the president of one security firm 
suggested that'every American could be given a smart card so, as they go into an 
airport or anywhere, we know exactly who they are.'1 Central to the advancement 
of surveillance technologies is the advent of biometrics.
Modern biometrics can automate the identification of people by measuring and 
analysing one or more of their distinct physical or behavioural characteristics. 
Biometric identification systems are essentially pattern recognition systems 
that use acquisition devices such as cameras and scanning devices to capture 
images, recordings or measurements of an individual's characteristics and 
computer hardware and software to extract, encode, store, and compare these 
characteristics. Some biometric systems require the subject's approval, however 
others operate passively or covertly, analysing data without the subject's 
knowledge. As the process is automated, biometric decision-making is generally 
immediate, in most cases taking only a few seconds in real time.2
Data used in biometrics can be encrypted, ensuring its security. Moreovera person's 
physical characteristics are unique and unlike identification cards and passwords 
they are not easily lost, stolen, counterfeited or otherwise compromised. Hence, 
theoretically, biometrics represents a more efficient approach to security than 
previous surveillance methods.3 There are four main categories of biometric 
surveillance technologies:
1) Fingerprinting: based on the graphical, flow-like ridges of the fingers, 
systems can provide a match for fingerprints in less than two hours.4
2) Facial imaging: a group of methods designed to reduce facial qualities to 
mathematical abstractions.
3) Hand geometry: creates mathematical pattern abstractions using data 
derived from 96 measurements of the hand.
4) Eye scanning: An iris scan uses an infrared light to create mathematical 
abstractions of patterns in the coloured tissue around the centre of the eye 
which has approximately 266 distinctive characteristics. Retinal scanning is 
similar, but analyses the patterns of veins occurring in the back of the eye.
While the benefits of such technologies are evident and the potential for their 
expansion foreseeable, it should be noted that biometrics is a young technology 
having only recently reached the point where basic matching performance can 
be achieved. Weaknesses in the security process, environmental conditions 
or failures by people to operate the technology can diminish its effectiveness. 
Similarly, the technology itself is not infallible and errors may sometimes occur.5 
Furthermore, hot all people can enrol in a biometrics system. Failure to enrol may 
stem from an insufficiently distinctive biometric sample or poor system design.
The US security environment
In 1974 Congress took significant steps for national security by implementing the 
Anti-hijacking Act and the Air Transportation Security Act. Both acts focused on 
hi-jacking and imposed penalties of 20 years imprisonment or death for carrying 
weapons or explosives aboard an aircraft. Screening of passengers and baggage 
was authorised.6 During the 1980s and 90s, the US government mandated more 
stringent risk assessment, airline employees' background checks and passenger 
profiling with the enactment of four more critical pieces of legislation: the Foreign 
Airport Security Act of 1985; the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990; the 
Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorisation Act of 1996; and the Aviation 
























When congress conferred comprehensive jurisdiction for aviation security on 
the Department of Transportation (DOT), the DOT was made responsible for 
regulating the screening of passengers and property, dealing with threats to 
domestic and international civil aviation, establishing security standards at 
foreign airports, issuing travel advice, the requirement of passenger manifests, 
providing airport construction guidelines, and fostering an accelerated program 
of security research and development including explosive detection.7
Despite these measures, the events of September 11 poignantly revealed the 
vulnerability of the U.S. civil transportation system which was totally unprepared 
for these attacks. Dempsey analysed four key factors which could be deemed as 
vulnerabilities:
1)The porous transportation security umbrella;
2) The undue reliance on a single mode of transportation;
3) A significant reliance on the transportation industry for America's 
economy;
4) Poor or nonexistent internodal connectivity.8
The 9/11 Commission also criticised the fact that no agency of the U.S. government 
systematically analysed terrorists' travel strategies. There was a lack of well- 
developed counterterrorism measures as a part of border security and the inept 
immigration system was not able to deliver on its basic commitments, much less 
support counterterrorism.9
The government swiftly undertook sweeping legislative reform on terrorism and 
national security in the aftermath of 9/11. This campaign was headed by the USA 
PATRIOT Act ('Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001'), which along with the 
Border Security Bill was designed to strengthen US borders, broaden the power 
of law enforcement agencies and secure the visa entry system.,0The USA PATRIOT 
Act permits greater sharing of intelligence information between law enforcement 
and national security investigators, regardless of the source of the intelligence 
information.11
In relation to aviation security, Congress federalised airport screening functions, 
establishing the new Transport Security Administration (TSA)12 under the DOT.
TheTSA became responsible for regulating security in all modes of transportation, 
imposing minimum job qualifications upon security employees, performing 
background checks on airport employees, research and development, screening 
passengers, baggage and cargo, assessing security threats, hiring security 
personnel, maintaining security facilities,13 as well as requiring the installation 
of impregnable cockpit doors via the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
of 2001.14 The TSA also implemented the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre- 
Screening (CAPPS) system with the aim of improving their ability for profiling. 
Notably this implementation involved amendments to the U.S. Privacy Act. 
Finally, Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002, thus consolidating 
twenty-two agencies and creating the Department of Homeland Security 
which was given jurisdiction, inter alia, over transportation security, customs, 
immigration and agricultural inspections. Some anti-terrorism efforts, including 
those involving access control to secure areas and identifying travellers, include 
biometric technologies.15
Various technological initiatives have been employed to meet new Congressional 
mandates and comply with recent legislative reforms. By way of illustration, 
to allow for the screening of all bags at U.S. airports, between 4000 and 6000 
Explosive Detection System machines were to be installed at 429 airports in the 
U.S.16 San Francisco International Airport has employed hand geometry devices 
in conjunction with identification cards to protect secure areas of the airport, 
such as the tarmac and loading gates. In 2003,Toledo (Ohio) Express Airport also 
installed hand geometry devices while Chicago's O'Hare International Airport 
required smart cards and fingerprint recognition to control access to cargo 
areas.17
CCTV has also become one of the main modes of surveillance within airports. This 
has allowed for the expansion of facial recognition technology and sophisticated 
tools such as the'Facelt'system which enables a standard PC to scan 70 million 
images per minute.18
Otherexamplesofadvancedsurveillancedevicesbasedonbiometric-technologies 
include the Trusted or Registered Traveller Program whereby a frequent flyer who 
provides the TSA with background information, later receives a biometrically 
enabled ID card. A further example is that of the National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System (NSEERS) which was implemented at several points of entry 
on September 11,2002. The initiative requires fingerprinting and photographing 
of all visitors to the U.S. at all U.S. borders, periodic registration of immigrants 
who stay in the country for more than 30 years and exit controls enabling officers 
























was involved in establishing modern visa systems based on sharing biometric 
information between federal databases as well as a computerised entry-exit 
system ensuring visitors comply with their entry conditions.
The Singaporean security environment
Singapore achieved self-government with independence in 1965 and has borne 
the stamp of the People's Action Party (PAP) rule for over forty years. Regarded 
as a safe and orderly nation it was one of the first places to adopt new ideas for 
increasing security efficiency.
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Lee Kuan Yew, the long ruling Prime Minister largely 
responsible for Singapore's economic success, instigated policy similar to the U.S. 
ensuring Singapore's critical locations were protected by highly sophisticated 
security technologies. The 'Total Defence' regime, which involves the entire 
citizenry in Singapore's defence, remains the cornerstone of Singapore's deterrent 
strategy. Furthermore Singapore has always placed cultural significance on the 
success of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and the ideology that Singapore is 
capable of defending itself.
Like Australia, Singapore's post 9/11 allegiance with westernised nations has 
essentially made it a terrorist target. This general notion was made evident in 
2002 with concerns of Islamic terrorist cells operating in Singapore. It is widely 
accepted that Islam is not synonymous with terrorism, however, given Singapore's 
multiracial population with its significant Islamic representation, it is feared that 
there may be opposition to international anti-terrorism campaigns originating 
from the U.S.20
In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Singapore strengthened its anti-terrorist 
efforts by passing laws such as the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act in 
2002, that codify United Nations resolutions relating to the funding of terrorist 
activities and making false terrorist threats. This legislative reform has been 
financially backed by the government. For example, the budget for homeland 
security reached $2.35 billion for 2004, representing a rise of 1.5% over 2003 and 
a jump of more than 10% over 2002.21
Additionally in response to internal and external terrorist threats, Singapore 
allocated additional funds to enlarging the SAF and the police force and has 
set up a new homeland security framework.22 Furthermore the new National 
Civil Aviation Security Committee protects Changi Airport from terrorist attacks 
by overseeing security procedures such as baggage security and restriction of 
access.23 Immigration officers at airports have also been given increased powers 
to direct and detain any suspect person entering the country.24
The Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) in charge of border security 
announced two projects aimed at being ready by last year: a $9 million system 
linking land, sea,, and air checkpoints electronically; and a $400,000 land 
checkpoint system that can clear travellers, screen vehicles and collect toll 
charges. Another project is biometric passports, which involve the scanning of 
personal characteristics like fingerprints and iris features onto a mobile computer 
chip.25 Furthermore, in 2004 the Minister of State and Transport, Balaji Sadasivan, 
announced that a new biometric-based security system would be tendered. 
Another such project is the new $80 million baggage screening system which 
was being implemented in late 2004.26 Currently the government is employing 
a fingerprinting machine in its border control strategy capable of matching print 
images in less than a minute.27
In 2003 another issue arose mandating the government implement advanced 
security systems at the international airport. In April 2003, Singapore added SARS 
to the Quarantine Act, a law which had previously been dormant for 27 years. 
Measures taken to combat SARS included 'contact tracing'and the thermal-image 
detection of body temperatures in public places.28 The relevant technology, 
Infrared Fever Scanning System (IFSS) was developed in Singapore and is currently 
used in more than fifty countries. Security cameras and electronic wristbands are 
also used to quarantine affected individuals.29
The Australian security environment
The series of events on September 11th 2001 impacted on national security 
systems in Australia. This impact was compounded by the tragic bombing in Bali 
on October 12th 2002. Prior to these two attacks, the use of surveillance devices by 
Commonwealth, State and Territory law enforcement agencies was regulated by 
a patchwork of divergent legislation,30 However following the bombings in Bali, 
the federal government announced that it would seek a transfer from the states 
of their power to legislate in respect of counter-terrorism.31
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission concluded that 'device specific' 
legislation would be impractical, requiring constant updating as technological 
developments inevitably outpace the law.32 It also concluded that regulating 
particular electronic devices was arbitrary, when surveillance could also be 
conducted through the use of other equipment it described as electro-magnetic, 
acoustic and mechanical.33 Finally, it has been acknowledged that the power of 
detention is an intelligence exercise based on universalised surveillance targeting 
an entire population.The notion of universalised surveillance itself has created an 
























Australia has introduced a raft of legislative measures post 9/11 including:
1) the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, which 
updated and expanded the offence of treason, and created new terrorism 
offences;
2) the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002, which created 
and offence directed at those who provide or collect funds for intentioned 
terrorist activities and required cash dealers to report transactions that are 
suspected to relate to terrorist activities;
3) the Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombing) Act 
2002, which created new offences for placing or detonating an explosive or 
other lethal device with the intention of causing death or serious harm;
4) ̂ Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act 2002, 
which allowed law enforcement to intercept electronic communications 
without a warrant; and
5) the Border Security Legislation Amendment Act 2002, which required 
airlines to provide Customs with access to their computer reservation 
systems in order to help identify high risk passengers.35 Under the new 
Customs Legislation Amendment and Repeal (International Trade 
Modernisation) Act 2001, cargo carriers are required to report their cargo 
before arrival.36
Furthermore the amended Criminal Act of 1995 now relates to any offence 
against UN counterterrorism instruments. The Crimes Legislation Amendment 
(Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures) Bill 2004 aims to ensure 
that Commonwealth criminal offences remain effective in the modern 
telecommunications environment and continues the government's proactive 
approach to updating criminal laws in light of rapid technological change.37 
Another example of this is the Australian Passports Bill 2004 which, not only 
creates stricter penalties, but for the first time considers the application of 
biometrics in passports.38
In 2002 the Commonwealth government committed $2.1 billion to ensure 
upgraded security, secure borders and strengthened defence forces.39 The 
Budget provided an additional $539 million to the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP), Australian Protective Service (APS) and Australian intelligence agencies 
to promote increased screening of imported goods, enhanced cooperation with
overseas law enforcement agencies, and improvements in screening arriving and 
departing international passengers. APS officers provide heightened security at 
Australia's airports with enhanced capacity for detecting explosives. Uniformed 
and plain clothed officers also travel on certain flights.
As a result of new air traffic control technology, flights across Australia are 
likely to be safer and have fewer delays. The technology, Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance (Broadcast) or ADS-B will be rolled out country-wide by 2005. Other 
initiatives include Australia's Advanced Passenger Processing system. From 2004 
the system required information on all international travellers (including crew) 
arriving by air or sea. Moreover, regional airports may be issued with further 
passenger screening equipment for use in heightened security situations under a 
$48 million package announced by federal government in August, 2004.40
Ensuring the reliability and authenticity of passports during the passenger 
screening process is a critical element of airport security. The 2002-3 Budget 
provided the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) with $3 million for 
research and development of a biometric identifier for the Australian passport. 
Positive results in facial recognition research assured furtherfunding was obtained 
in the 2003-04 Budget.41 Proposed changes to the Australian Passport Act noted 
above will provide forthe inclusion of a facial biometric indicator in new passports 
and strengthen the government's ability to combat identity fraud.
Future systems in Australia may see a person's passport photo used to create a 
detailed electronic portrait of their face using biometric technology. This portrait 
will then be stored on a tamper-proof microchip inside the passport This system 
not only assures passport integrity but also efficiency by allowing computers to 
automate passport checking at border control points.42
In order to improve identity verification processing and reduce fraud, a facial 
recognition technology called 'SmartGate' is also being trialled. This system is 
advocated due to its less invasive methods, as essentially no physical contact need 
occur between the passenger, machine or officer.43 Another development, known 
as the IP@SS (Integrated Passenger Security Solutions) System involves biometric 
data and passenger profiling being incorporated into a'smart card'which may be 
applied for in advance, lessening processing time at the airport.44
The government's pro-active stance in relation to biometrics at airports has 
resulted in Australia meeting international technological benchmarks. Armed with 
new legislation and a funding commitment, following international compatibility 
























biometrics.45 The implementation of modern surveillance equipment will1 give 
law enforcement bodies greater power to detect illegal cross border activities 
and successfully prosecute offenders.46 Moreover, new legislation amending the 
Migration Act 1958, will allow for more efficient identification of non-citizens by 
providing a clear framework for the collection of biometric identity information 
(including fingerprints, facial and iris recognitions).47
Examination of the biometric-based electronic 
surveillance systems
As illustrated above, each ofthethree countries has recently implemented stronger 
surveillance measures incorporating advanced technology and biometrics. 
However, modern circumstances have also witnessed crowded transportation 
facilities like airports becoming attractive targets for terrorist attacks.48 Biometrics 
have the potential to prevent this by ensuring accurate identification, a 
cornerstone of security and the essence of countering identity fraud. Another 
key advantage of biometrics is that they invariably focus on unique attributes and 
are more difficult to falsify than traditional documentation. Moreover, the cost 
involved in integrating biometrics is decreasing.
As illustrated biometric-searches have many advantages and biometrics would 
generally offer a more secure airport environment. However the effectiveness 
of biometrics cannot be merely assumed and the following factors should be 
considered:
1) Eligibility criteria for biometric programs;
2) The content of background checks to certify eligible applicants for 
enrolment in a program;
3) Security-screening procedures for differentiating between registered 
travellers and unregistered travellers; and
4) The extent of privacy liability to be protected prior to the 
implementation49
Another importantfeature of biometric implementation is the ability of individuals 
to challenge the technology50 and related rulings such as the suspension of a 
passport.This factor is not only important to democracy and natural justice but 
also ensures effective review of the technology and will help remedy errors. 
Notably a major failure of any surveillance system is that despite its efficiency, its
effectiveness can only be ensured if it cannot be circumvented. For example, in 
the case of 9/11 attacks, the identity of each hijacker was known and each was 
allowed to board the plane. Even those accepted by surveillance systems may still 
intend to cause harm.
Onefeaturethatisessentialtothesuccessofenhancedinternationaltransportation 
security is international cooperation. Regardless of the efficiency of biometrics, 
their enduring success in counter-terrorism will necessarily involve cohesion and 
cooperation between different nations. Technology alone will be less effective in 
the absence of intentional collaboration on data sharing, as envisaged by the USA 
PATRIOT Act.
Regarding international collaboration post 9/11, President Bush announced: 
"Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, 
or you are with the terrorists... what is at stake is not just America's freedom.There 
is the world's fight. There is civilisation's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in 
progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us."51 
In addition, the 9/11 Committee recommended that the U.S. should engage other 
nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against terrorism, with a 
view to targeting terrorist travel and sanctuary.52 In accordance with this position, 
the U.S. recently extended the deadline for twenty-one nations in a 'Visa-Waiver 
Program'to begin to incorporate biometrics into passports. It suggests that the 
U.S. no longer feels secure and that it requires intensified cooperation from other 
countries particularly those known to be the home of terrorist organisations. To 
be successful, the U.S. needs to keep inviting, persuading and pressuring foreign 
governments to join with it in fighting terrorism globally.
Recent U.S. advancements have included enhanced identification systems such 
asthelDENT and United States Visitor and Immigrant Status IndicatorTechnology 
(US-VISIT) systems, which require visitors to the U.S. to submit a biometric 
identifier to the U.S. government. Systems such as these have been implemented 
at many entry points to the U.S., as have immigration tracking programs. As 
envisioned by the USA PATRIOT Act and Border Security Act the US-VISIT program 
was intended to be expanded to include other categories of foreign nationals. 
Accordingly Singapore and Australia will likely have to adapt their domestic visa 
policies for fear of not being able to obtain a U.S. visa.The Australian government 
has acknowledged as much stating that"the war on terrorism is not a battle which 
can be fought on one front."53
Effective cooperation on counter-terrorism however, involves much more than 
























100 be denied that U.SVSingapore relations have been difficult at times. However the 
U.S. is clearly the major power most important to Singapore and the relationship 
has been consistently on good terms in regards to defence diplomacy. Singapore 
also has long supported the presence of the U.S. in Southeast Asia and regarded 
it as crucial to peace and stability in the region. The two countries moved closer 
with the arrests in Singapore of suspected terrorists in three cells of the Jemaah 
Islamiah, who were apparently plotting to attack the U.S.54The relations between 
these two countries have warmed with the bilateral free trade agreement in 2003, 
the growth of U.S. investment in Singapore, and the large number of Singaporeans 
visiting and studying in the U.S. resulting in their incorporation in the Visa Waiver 
Program.55
Similar to Singapore's foreign policy, the U.S. has been recognised as an influence 
in Australian domestic policies. Australia is regarded as a strong ally of the U.S. 
and relations between these two countries have been recently secured by the 
bilateral free trade agreement, growth of U.S. investment in Australia and the 
re-election of Prime Minister Howard. Accordingly, Australia is also a Visa Waiver 
Program country.
One potential strategy relying on international relationships is extradition. The 
United Nations (UN) recognised extraditing criminals as an effective scheme 
against transnational organised crime including terrorism.56 To keep suspects 
from fleeing prosecution in one country and reaching freedom in another, the 
UN suggests nations should recognise crimes as extraditable when no extradition 
treaty exits with the nation where the suspect is located and conclude bilateral 
and multilateral agreements to make extradition more effective.57
The U.S. currently has extradition treaties with about 111 countries including 
important Asian nations. Singapore has extradition legislation and furthermore 
where no extradition treaty is in force between Singapore and another country, 
the UN Convention may be applied to allow extradition.58 Australia also has 
extradition legislation under which an extraditable offence is basically defined 
as any offence punishable in Australia.59 Most extradition requests have been 
granted to the U.S.,60 however the act was amended by the Criminal Act 2002 
which ensures that offences are not regarded for the purpose of extradition as 
"political" offences in response to 9/11,61
While there appears to be a level of cooperation between these three countries, 
it should be noted that the Singaporean and the U.S. governments ultimately 
believe that national interests may at times supersede the need for cooperation.
Possible conflicts in biometric technology 
implementation
Current national security trends in these three countries are leaning toward 
stricter security laws and more invasive technology implementation.This has also 
been the trend elsewhere globally. However, arguably the new technologies are 
likely to give rise to unintended consequences that hinge on questions of legality, 
privacy invasion, diplomatic difficulties and the differences in cultural and moral 
values inherent in each country.
Issues relating to the legality of biometric-based 
system application
As biometrics are a relatively new technology, there is a paucity of cases which 
examine biometric application in legal procedure. However, there are several 
cases in which the legal applicability of biometric technology is mentioned, in 
particular in the U.S.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects "the right of people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures".62 Courts in the U.S. have indicated that the use of advanced 
surveillance equipment, not generally available to the public, may warrant Fourth 
Amendment protection.63 In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that where physical 
evidence is collected from a person, gathering of that evidence must not intrude 
into the person's body and furthermore the potential to reveal private medical 
facts about that person must not infringe the expectation of privacy that society 
recognises as reasonable.64 Given this dictate, it is often questioned whether 
certain biometric rftethods would breach the amendment.
A similar consideration is whether subjecting a person to other advanced 
technology such as facial recognition biometrics will violate the Fifth Amendment. 
While facial recognition technology has not been specifically judged, other 
biometric issues have arisen in the courts. For example, the use of handwriting 
exemplars as a means of identifying suspected criminals was found not to have 
violated the defendant's right against self7incrimination65 nor did the use of voice 
exemplars.66
More recently, U.S. Courts tackled the issue of high-tech, sense-enhancing 
surveillance equipment. The Supreme Court determined that when "the 
government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details... 
























102 surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."67 
One exception to the need for a warrant is an 'administrative search'. An 
administrative search is one "conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme 
in furtherance of an administrative purpose."68 As Star attests, airport searches 
employing the use of biometrics pursuant to the ATSA fall under this definition 
and accordingly, biometric-based searches at airports should be exempt from the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.69 However the courts have continued 
to assess new technologies on a case by case basis. This is important in balancing 
biometrics and the need for U.S. government to act within the Constitution.
Privacy issues and biometric systems
As technology advances and that which was once unique becomes commonplace, 
privacy standards have had to evolve in order to apply to modern technology. 
Biometric technology invariably involves, some invasion to the individual and 
accordingly the advent of this type of surveillance has led to privacy concerns. 
The U.S. has enacted legislation for the use of biometrics such as the USA PATRIOT 
Act, the ATSA and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, at 
present in the U.S., the Constitution, Federal law and State privacy laws provide 
little in the way of privacy protection.
According to one definition privacy is the 'right to be left alone'.70 Additionally, 
privacy is part of the claim to personal autonomy and arguably supports the 
various freedoms that democratic countries value. However, the modern trend 
towards enhanced security has witnessed the advent of biometric-based search 
technologies while governments questionably turn a blind eye to privacy. 
Generally an invasive action such as a personal search should be accompanied by 
a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to that action, however security 
measures in place have substantially lowered the privacy expectation in airports. 
71 In some cases airport searches are reconciled with privacy rights due to the 
passengers consenting.72 However, in keeping with the subjective expectation of 
privacy, U.S. Courts have held that passengers must have the option to leave at 
any point prior to or during a search.73 Moreover while the U.S. Constitution does 
not specifically guarantee a right to privacy, the Supreme Court has recognised 
a limited right to privacy in several cases.74 Furthermore despite their dearth at 
a federal level, several states have created privacy rights. For example, California 
has created privacy rights for its citizens end moreover has declared that privacy 
is an inalienable right.75
The U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 provides additional protection tq individual privacy. 
The 1974 Act limits federal agencies'collection, use, and disclosure of personal 
information and hence generally applies to personal biometric information. 
However, the Act provides exemptions for law enforcement and national
security purposes.76 Furthermore, surveillance for national security purposes is 
now governed by the FISA which has less rigorous requirements.77 Similarly the 
USA PATRIOT Act has substantially weakened protection from wiretapping and 
programs such as Total Information Access (TIA) and CAPPS-II allegedly present 
further risks to civil liberties.78 Amendments to The Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) allow anyone to access federal government records. However, once again 
there are exceptions that weaken the effectiveness of the Act. Additionally as 
biometrics are operated on computer systems, they have become susceptible to 
new threats such as hacking.79 One method advocated to prevent the abuse of 
biometrics is the objective monitoring and control of the technology,80 including 
public notification as seen in California.81
Singapore also provides regulation of privacy rights generally and more 
specifically in relation to data protection. For example the E-Commerce Code for 
the Protection of Personal Information and Communications of Consumers of 
Internet Commerce, prohibitsthe disclosure of personal information, and regulates 
service providers.82 Also major bills have been enacted such as the Computer 
Misuse (Amendment) Act which prohibits the unauthorised interception of 
computer communications.83 However, due to the outbreak of SARS, the events 
of September 11 and the modern government's strict national security policy, 
legislation currently provides police with broad powers of investigation. Singapore 
has no constitutional right to privacy and although government officials are 
normally required to obtain court-issued search warrants, broad exceptions exist 
to this weak rule.84
Under the authoritarian leadership of Singapore's founding father, Lee Kwan 
Yew, Singapore effectively legitimised the rejection of liberal values.85 As a 
result, Singapore is regarded as an almost totalitarian regime with a low value 
of personal privacy.86 Citing the doctrine that'the kind of society determines the 
level of privacy protection', Singapore ,has gained a reputation for aggressively 
using surveillance for social control. Reputably Lee is even proud of interfering in 
the private lives of citizens.87
In contrast, the common law in Australia provides some protection against 
unjustified surveillance. The laws of trespass, nuisance and defamation may 
provide the subject of surveillance with redress in certain circumstances.88 
Also the Privacy Acts of 1988 and 1998 have instilled strict rules on collection, 
use and storage of personal information including tax file numbers. However, 
legislative amendments in 2002 and 2003 have given ASIO significant and highly 
controversial new powers including the ability to detain and question individuals 
























104 Ultimately as Lyon argues, “although privacy laws and data-protection are very 
important, by themselves they remain inadequate as a means of limiting today's 
newly augmented surveillance power."90 It is also argued that while personal privacy 
is paramount, intrusions into it by way of surveillance are sometimes necessary 
for the greater public benefit.91 Dripps attests that when the unexpected cost 
of crime includes the loss of entire cities, the standard liberal position becomes 
either untenable or fanatical.92 Hence although privacy encourages free thought 
and free expression and limits the reach of government power, it is inevitable 
that at times it will be discarded in the name of counter terrorism. Jhe real risk to 
privacy however, will occur when use of biometrics are employed covertly.93
Diplomatic difficulty
As discussed the global nature of terrorism and potential for sharing counter­
terrorism information via new technologies has made international cooperation 
highly desirable. However, as was also noted earlier, achieving such cooperation 
is seldom easy. It is argued that foreign policies that isolate, and further alienate, 
so-called 'rogue-states' will result in the continuance, not curtailment, of state- 
sponsored terrorism.94 Furthermore, discrimination and prejudice have increased 
due to the religious motivation and nationality of many terrorist groups. While 
U.S.A./Australian/Singaporean relations are sound in these respects, vast cultural 
differences between Eastern nations, such as Singapore, and Western nations, 
such as the U.S. and Australia, have had significant affects. This point is critical 
in integrating international collaboration, although a detailed discussion is far 
beyond the scope of this legal/technological paper. Notably however, as western 
laws become more invasive and strict, as has been witnessed in both the U.S. and 
Australia, they progressively merge with Asia's more authoritarian culture.
Conclusion
As discussed, these three countries have changed their laws to address 
the environment following '9/11'. Each country has increased the ability of 
law enforcement and national security agencies to perform interception of 
communications, and has transformed search powers. Each country has also 
instigated an increase in the type of data that can be accessed via new anti-terror 
laws which expand surveillance authority.
For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons. In their travels, 
terrorists use altered and counterfeit passports and visas, specific travel methods 
and routes. Thus, increased airport security prior to boarding appears to be the 
most effective means of preventing politically motivated hijackings and other 
attacks. Therefore, as examined, biometric technologies are available today
that can be used for aviation security to detect these activities. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that effective security cannot be achieved by relying 
on technology alone. Technology and people must work cohesively in overall 
security processes. To this end, programs for international cooperation that 
consider diplomacy, privacy rights, cultural differences and vital data sharing 
should be established.
The serious problem of how surveillance technology should be used remains. 
None of the biometric systems outlined above would have prevented the tragedy 
of September 11th. This is because all of the attackers already had valid identity 
cards with a biometric authenticator and a state-issued driver’s license with a 
photograph. The airlines knew the identities of the attackers and allowed them 
to board their flights without question. What was not known was their intentions. 
In this paper, elements of the success of the future of surveillance, particularly 
biometrics, have been discussed. However, it is apparent that successful solutions 
must involve a vast range of measures.
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